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Abstract
In (deRosset, 2015), I argued that there are counterexamples to the
claim that the sentences analytically entailed by a claim φ require nothing
more of the world for their truth than does φ. The counterexamples
involve sentences which, I argued, are analytically entailed by certain
truths, but which nevertheless require more of the world for their truth.
John Horden has offered two interesting criticisms of this argument. First,
he contends that its conclusion is inconsistent. Second, he contends that
the argument faces a dilemma, depending on which of two hypotheses
about the meanings of the sentences involved in the counterexamples turns
out to be true. Here I reply to Horden’s criticisms and briefly indicate
what I take their lesson to be.
In (deRosset, 2015) (henceforth, AO), I argued that there are counterexamples
to each of the following two principles:
DAO If P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory
that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more
ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist.
GAO If P analytically entails Q, then (P ∧ Q) requires nothing more of the
world than does P .
John Horden has offered interesting criticisms of that argument. In this short
note, I reply to the criticisms and briefly indicate what I take their lesson to be.
The putative counterexamples toGAO andDAO are of essentially the same
sort. For the sake of simplicity, then, I will focus on a putative counterexample to
GAO. In AO I asked readers to suppose that we had stipulated that ‘grassgreen’
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is to be a predicate that expresses the property being green if, as a matter of
fact, grass is green, and not being green otherwise. To simplify the discussion,
let’s dispense with suppositions: I do hereby so stipulate. I trust you know
enough to recognize that grass is grassgreen. Also, as you may know, the flesh
of kiwi fruit, clover, and most freeway signs in the U.S. are grassgreen. Neither
roses nor violets are grassgreen.
My argument that this stipulation yields a counterexample to GAO relied
on three premises.
A My stipulation is successful, where “success” in this sense entails that, as a
result of the stipulation, its content is true.
B “Disquoting” the content of a successful stipulation yields an analytic truth.
C Requirements for the truth of a sentence of the form ‘τ is grassgreen’ are
given by which individual (if any) is the referent of τ and which property
is expressed by ‘grassgreen’ in a straightforward way: the requirement is
that that very individual have that very property.
Given (A), we may conclude that, if grass is, as a matter of fact, green, then
‘grassgreen’ expresses being green, and, otherwise, ‘grassgreen’ expresses not
being green. Application of (B) then yields the analyticity of
(1) if, as a matter of fact, grass is green, then something is grassgreen iff it is
green; and, otherwise, something is grassgreen iff it is not green.
It is then very simple to show that
(2) snow is white
analytically entails
(3) grass is grassgreen.
Application of (C), together with the fact that grass is, as a matter of fact,
green, yields the conclusion that (3) requires for its truth that grass have the
property being green. Since that requirement clearly goes beyond requirements
for the truth of (2), we have a counterexample to GAO.
In his comment on AO, Horden offers two reasons for thinking this argu-
ment unsound. First, he contends that its conclusion is inconsistent. Second,
he contends that my argument faces a dilemma, depending on which of two
2
deRosset Stipulations and Requirements
hypotheses about the meaning of (3) turns out to be true. I will discuss each
contention in turn.
Horden’s charge of inconsistency is made on p. XXXXX: “If ‘grass is grass-
green’ is guaranteed to be actually true, no matter what colour grass actually
has, then it cannot require of the actual world that grass be green. Even if we
grant that the stipulation succeeds, it seems sensible to examine the semantics
of the novel term ‘grassgreen’ a little more closely before we embrace inconsis-
tency” (emphasis original). It is a little difficult to see what is supposed to be
inconsistent here. The guarantee is epistemic, while requirements for the truth
of a claim concern the metaphysical or semantic question of what the world has
to be like for the claim to be true. Given (C), any residual air of inconsistency
dissolves once we realize that the success of the stipulation entails that the truth
of (3) requires one thing if, as a matter of fact, grass is not green and another
thing if, as a matter of fact, grass is green.
Horden does not explicitly say why an epistemic guarantee of the truth of
a sentence is supposed to be inconsistent with there being substantial require-
ments for its truth. But he provides a clue when he suggests a schematic bi-
conditional governing requirements: “a sentence φ requires of the world that R
iff (i) ‘R’ does not logically follow from sentences that are true entirely because
of their meanings, and (ii) whichever world is actual, if φ is true, this is partly
because R” (p. XXXX).1 Horden only tentatively advances this biconditional,
but says that his argument assumes the following consequence of its left-to-right
direction (p. XXXXX):
L1 if a sentence requires of the world that R, then, whichever world is actual,
that sentence is true only if R.
With (L1) in hand, it’s pretty clear why Horden thinks the argument against
GAO entangles us in inconsistency. Consider the relevant instance of (L1):
L2 If (3) requires of the world that grass is green, then, whichever world is
actual, (3) is true only if grass is green.
If the argument from (A)-(C) is sound, then, because grass is in fact green, (3)
in fact requires of the world that grass is green. However, if grass turns out as
a matter of fact to be purple – if, that is, a world in which grass is purple turns
1I have benefited here from personal correspondence with Horden.
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out to be actual – then the soundness of the argument implies that (3) does
not require that grass be green. This would contravene (L2), which entails that
(3)’s requiring of the world that grass be green be insensitive to how things turn
out to be as a matter of fact. So, the contention that the argument involves us
in an inconsistency can be made good if we assume (L1).
But (L1) faces counterexamples. I have just flipped a coin. I hereby stipulate
that ‘TrueThat’ is a syntactically atomic sentence that requires for its truth that
grass be green if the coin landed heads, and requires for its truth that grass not
be green otherwise. The stipulation passes all of the standard tests for successful
stipulation. In particular, it is conservative and harmonious, and passes what in
AO (pp. 141-4) I called Stevenson’s constraint. I have gone on to use ‘TrueThat’
in conversation with my colleagues, friends, and family. As you will see, I will
even be using it in this paper. Given its success, the content of my ‘TrueThat’
stipulation is true. So, (L1) has a false instance:
L3 If ‘TrueThat’ requires of the world that grass is green, then, whichever world
is actual, ‘TrueThat’ is true only if grass is green.
It turns out that the coin landed heads. This provides enough information for
you to recognize that TrueThat iff grass is green. If, however, a world in which
the coin landed tails is actual, then TrueThat iff grass is not green. In general,
we appear to be able, under the right circumstances, to successfully stipulate
the requirements for the truth of new sentences. What’s more, we have at our
disposal devices for conditionalizing on how things are as a matter of fact in
the content of such stipulations. So, (L1) appears to implausibly restrict our
stipulative powers. It thus provides no reason to think that the argument from
(A)-(C) against GAO entangles us in any inconsistency.
Horden’s second objection to the argument from (A)-(C) is that it faces a
dilemma, depending on what we take (3) to mean. In AO (p. 148), I argued that
the force of the putative counterexamples was independent of which of several
plausible hypotheses about the meaning of, e.g., (3) turned out to be correct,
and otherwise avoided explicit discussion about the meanings of my stipulated
terms. A word of explanation for why we might want to avoid claims about what
(3) means may, however, be appropriate. The issue is that there are a dizzying
array of different semantic values that might be assigned to (3). Assume for
illustration that the occurence of ‘grass’ in (3) is a singular term, so that (3) has
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the form ‘a is F ’, where a is a term and F is a predicate.2 Then it is plausible
to claim that the sentence expresses a russellian proposition represented by
〈grass, being green〉. Certainly, a proponent of DAO is in no position to deny
that sentences like (3) express such russellian propositions, given how ‘russellian
proposition’ and related vocabulary is used in the philosophical community. But
such a proponent is also in no position to deny that (3) has other semantic values,
including a truth value, a carnapian intension, a character (Kaplan, 1989), or
perhaps even a primary intension (Chalmers, 2002). Which, if any, of these
semantic values should we hold gives the meaning of (3)? It seemed to me that
nothing interesting hung on which of many plausible answers we might give to
this question.
Horden disagrees. Here is his dilemma. If (3) means
(4) grass is green
then, Horden contends, (B) is false: though the stipulation succeeds and the
truth of (3) requires that grass have the property being green, (3) is not analytic.
Alternatively, if (3) means
(5) grass is green iff grass is actually green
then, Horden contends, (C) is false: the requirements for the truth of (3) are
trivially satisfied and so cannot include that grass have the property being green.
More generally, Horden’s argument here might be taken to suggest that there is
no way of fixing a meaning for any sentence on which both (B) and the analogue
of (C) are true. That is, there is no way of fixing a meaning for a sentence so
that, like (4), it requires for its truth that grass be green, but, like (5), it is
analytic.
Let’s consider each horn of the dilemma in turn. On the first horn, the de-
fense of GAO would require that (3) be synthetic, even though it has what in
AO (p. 158) I called the trappings of analyticity : the conventions governing the
use of (3) guarantee that it is entailed by certain sentences such that failure to
accept any of these sentences constitutes some measure of linguistic incompe-
tence. For instance, one of the conventions governing the use of (3) is given by
the content of my ‘grassgreen’ stipulation. From those conventions, instances of
2If (3) lacks such a structure, then it will express some slightly more complicated russellian
singular proposition, but the point in the main text would be unaffected.
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certain disquotation principles, and a little logic, it’s easy to work out that (3)
is true.
This certainly makes it look as if (3) is analytic, and it seems to me that there
is little reason to deny that it really is analytic short of antecedent commitment
to GAO. Thus, I would argue that the most plausible verdict on this horn of
the dilemma is that my ‘grassgreen’ stipulation has fixed the meaning of (3) in
such a way as to make both (B) and (C) true.
Suppose, however, that I’m completely wrong about that. Suppose, that
is, that appearances in this case really are misleading in the way that Horden
contends: (3) has the trappings of analyticity but is not analytic. Horden’s
contention here is an instance of a more general strategy for defending DAO
and GAO from the putative counterexamples. This defense denies that the
possession of the trappings of analyticity is enough to guarantee analyticity. But
the defense thereby gives up an important methodological advantage on which
the philosophical applications of DAO rely. If a sentence can have the trappings
of analyticity without being analytic, then we can’t rely on our appreciation of
the trappings of analyticity in cases like
(6) If particles p1, . . . , pn are arranged table-wise in L, then there is a table
in L
to warrant the application of DAO. Thus, a radical ontologist who agrees that
particles p1, . . . , pn are arranged table-wise in L but denies that there is a ta-
ble there can admit that (6) has the trappings of analyticity while reasonably
denying that it is analytic. In AO (p. 159), I concluded on this basis that, on
this response, “DAO is saved, but it’s rendered toothless.”3
A defender of DAO and GAO might reply by distinguishing mere uninter-
preted strings from meaningful expressions of an interpreted language.4 The
idea is that (3) fails to be analytic because ‘grassgreen’ is a mere uninterpreted
string: the content of my stipulation gives us reason to think that that string
will be true when it acquires a meaning, but no reason to think that any mean-
ingful interpreted sentence is true. It is only meaningful, interpreted sentences
that are analytic or synthetic, so (3) is not even the right sort of thing to be
analytic. This reply runs afoul of the fact that ‘grassgreen’ is already a term
being used meaningfully (if only by me) to characterize things. In the second
3Please see AO §4.2 for more extended discussion.
4Here again I benefit from correspondence with Horden.
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paragraph of this paper, for instance, I used it three times. On each occasion,
I asserted something true. Perhaps you count yourself as falling short of ideal
competence with the expression, but you know enough to recognize the truth
of (3). So, (3) is already a meaningful sentence of an interpreted language, and
the content of my stipulation provides an epistemic guarantee of its truth. It
won’t, then, fail to be analytic for want of semantic significance.
Consider now the second horn of Horden’s dilemma, on which we assume
that (3) means the same thing as
(5) grass is green iff grass is actually green.
The defender of GAO holds that (5) requires nothing of the world. If this claim
is granted, then, the semantic equivalence of (3) and (5) yields the falsity of (C):
like (5), (3) requires nothing of the world.
Horden is correct to think that (C) entails that (3) and (5) are semantically
discernible. In particular, the biconditional (5) won’t bear an interpretation on
which its truth requires that grass have the property being green. So, if (3)
and (5) were semantically indiscernible, then (C) would fail because (3), like
(5), would also fail to require that grass have the property being green. I would
think, however, that the claim that (3) and (5) are semantically indiscernible is
independently implausible. (3) has semantic values that (5) lacks, including the
russellian proposition represented by 〈grass, being green〉. So, Horden is correct
to contend that (C) is, plausibly, false if (3) means the same thing as (5); but
it is not plausible to hold that (3) means the same thing as (5).
In any case, we can tweak the argument a little to avoid this horn of the
dilemma entirely, using a stipulation much like my ‘TrueThat’ stipulation. I
hereby stipulate that ‘GreenThat’ is a syntactically atomic sentence that re-
quires for its truth that grass be green if, as a matter of fact, grass is green;
and that grass not be green otherwise. I have gone on to use ‘GreenThat’ in
conversation with my colleagues, friends, and family. You know enough about
grass to recognize that GreenThat iff grass is green, so you could use it too if
you were so inclined. My stipulation passes all of the standard tests for suc-
cessful stipulation. In particular, it is conservative and harmonious, and passes
Stevenson’s constraint. The stipulation takes the analogue of the second horn
of Horden’s dilemma off the table. In fact, it takes the denial of the analogue of
(C) off the table if the success of my stipulation is granted. If the ‘GreenThat’
stipulation is successful, then its content is true, so it requires for its truth that
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grass be green. For this reason, insofar as one is willing to countenance the
idea that linguistic conventions or stipulations fix meanings for sentences, my
‘GreenThat’ stipulation illustrates a way to fix a meaning for a sentence on
which both (B) and the analogue of (C) appear to be true.
I have argued that neither the objection based on (L1) nor the dilemma
ultimately threatens the cogency of the putative counterexamples to DAO and
GAO. But we shouldn’t let these difficulties for the objections obscure the more
general lessons of Horden’s discussion. Horden is admirably explicit about the
assumption (L1) governing requirements for the truth of a sentence on which his
first objection depends. Though, as I have argued, (L1) itself is implausibly re-
strictive, I believe that this is a fruitful line of inquiry for the analyticity theorist
to pursue. (L1) is part of Horden’s proposal for a partial theory of requirements.
I think (L1) itself is false, but there are other aspects of that theory that are
quite attractive. For instance, on Horden’s tentative proposal, the requirements
for the truth of a sentence are canonically given by a specification of the form
(7) Sentence S requires that φ.
Further, the requirements for the truth of a given sentence are conceived by
Horden as playing an explanatory role: they specify the conditions in virtue of
which S is true (if it is). These seem like fruitful starting points for a theory of
requirements.
To my mind, the most promising line of defense for GAO and DAO will
follow Horden’s lead: first, articulate, motivate, and defend a (perhaps partial)
theory of requirements; then, show that, on that theory, the proposed coun-
terexamples fail. Moreover, the discussion of Horden’s dilemma has outlined
the strategy that the defense must follow. The theory of requirements on which
the defense relies must be supported well enough to motivate the rejection of
the otherwise plausible claim that such stipulations as the ones introducing
‘grassgreen’ and ‘GreenThat’ are successful.5
5Thanks are due to Mark Moyer and Kate Nolfi for comments on earlier drafts. Special
thanks are due to John Horden for helpful correspondence. Thanks also to Amanda Lowe for
help in preparing the text.
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